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Summary
This paper analyzes incentives for polluting firms to exchange abatement cost
information under the non-linear pollution tax scheme (‘differential tax’) introduced by
Kim and Chang [J. Regul. Econom. 5, 1993, 193-197]. It shows that polluting firms
have - under mild conditions - an incentive to join a coalition whose members mutually
truthfully exchange information as well as commit themselves with respect to their
abatement decisions. As a result, the differential tax triggers instantly - i.e. no abatement
adaptation is needed – efficient abatement levels without the regulator knowing
marginal abatement costs. Consequently, this paper shows that differential taxation
results in lower social costs than traditional non-linear taxation which triggers efficient
emissions only after a period of non-efficient abatement.
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To minimize social costs in the presence of environmental pollution, one option a
regulator has to internalize externalities is through pollution taxation. To be able to
set the correct emission tax, however, this regulator should know (future) abatement
costs across industries. Unfortunately, polluters have in general no incentive to reveal
their true abatement costs - Kwerel (1977) and Dasgupta et al. (1980) dealt with this
issue - or just do not know them yet due to uncertainty about future innovation options
available
Non-linear taxation has been suggested as one solution in cases where marginal abate-
ment costs are not known by the regulator (Kim and Chang, 1993; Kaplow and Shavell,
2002). Under non-linear taxation the marginal tax level is a function of aggregated
emissions and mimics marginal damages, doing potentially a better job in equalizing
marginal abatement and marginal damage costs than standard (linear) taxation with
its constant marginal tax level. Unfortunately, the problem has not been solved how
potential polluters should resolve the uncertainty with respect to emissions of other
ﬁrms - emissions that determine the tax level under a non-linear taxation scheme. If
abatement decisions involve sunk costs or take time to be implemented this uncertainty
will lead to ineﬃciencies because ﬁrms will not or only at high costs be able to pollute
instantly at the socially optimal level.
Several attempts were made to guide the polluting ﬁrms to the eﬃcient emission level
in the presence of non-linear taxation under asymmetric information. These included
(i) a tax adjustment rule that automatically changes the tax level as a function of
actual emissions, resulting - after an unspeciﬁed period of time - in the socially eﬃ-
cient emission level1 (Karp and Livernois, 1994), (ii) ﬁrm commitment to the reported
1Under the condition that ﬁrms behave non-strategically. If they behave strategically there is a
trade-oﬀ between speed of convergence of the tax level and its eﬃciency in equilibrium.
3abatement costs to prevent excessive under-reporting of abatement costs leading to
better forecasts of the emission and tax level (Bulckaen, 1997), and (iii) abatement
based on conjectures about emissions by other ﬁrms (McKitrick, 1999). In the latter
paper, McKitrick proved that the simple non-linear ‘diﬀerential tax’ suggested by Kim
and Chang (1993) triggers the socially optimal level of pollution in the long run, with-
out the regulator knowing marginal abatement costs. ‘Long run’ refers to the time that
it takes for ﬁrms to sequentially adapt their abatement decisions - based on conjectures
with respect to emissions by other ﬁrms - until the socially optimal emission level is
reached.
This paper analyzes incentives for ﬁrms to form coalitions to exchange information with
respect to their abatement behavior under the above-mentioned ‘diﬀerential tax’ and
discusses the welfare eﬀects of this coalition formation. In game-theoretic terms: the
paper analyzes the welfare eﬀects of a cooperative game with asymmetric information
that is the result of the announcement of a diﬀerential pollution tax (Allen, 1997). A
prominent role in the analysis plays the commitment to announced abatement behavior
as was originally suggested by Bulckaen (1997).
Section 2 introduces the model. Section 3 and section 4 present the results on in-
formation exchange and coalition formation respectively. Section 5 concludes with a
discussion.
2 The model
Total emissions E of an environmental pollutant causes in monetary terms quantiﬁable
damages D(E), with D0(E) > 0 and D00(E) > 0. Set I represents the set of n polluting
ﬁrms, and the ﬁrms in I have the opportunity to reduce emissions, but face abatement
costs Ci(ei), where ei is the emission level of ﬁrm i, with Ci(ei) > 0 if and only if
0 < ei < emax; C0
i(ei) < 0; and C00




ei. The ﬁrms are not ﬂexible with respect to their abatement level in the sense
that they cannot - or only at high costs - change emissions immediately and therefore
have to decide on the emission abatement level one period before the actual emissions
take place.
The regulator does not know the abatement costs of the ﬁrms. Firm i does not know
the abatement costs of ﬁrm j either, but has at least some subjective expectation of
the emission which is denoted by ˆ ei
j.2
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i. As in McKitrick (1999, p.356) the standard Cournot assumption is
employed that ﬁrms do not believe their abatement decision will simultaneously change
other ﬁrms’ emission levels.3
Following Kim and Chang (1993) and McKitrick (1999) we assume that the regulator
announces it will levy a charge of D(E) − D(E − ei) on ﬁrm i’s emission ei. The
rationale of this tax is that the marginal emission tax paid by ﬁrm i is always equal to
2One might consider to specify ˆ ei
j properly, for example by introducing explicit stochastics in the
model: ﬁrm i does not know the vector θj, j 6= i, that determines the abatement costs ﬁrm j. It
does know, however, a distribution of stochastic vector θj, and developed - based on that knowledge
- a subjective expectation of the emissions of ﬁrm j denoted by ˆ ei
j given a particular policy. In my
view this would make the analysis in thus paper unnecessarily complex and less general and would
therefore distract from its quintessence.
3Because this assumption also underlies the analysis in McKitrick (1999), the results derived in
this paper are as general as they are in McKitrick (1999).
5marginal damage costs, thereby minimizing social costs.4. The announcement of the
diﬀerential tax scheme is assumed to be made prior to any abatement decision of the
ﬁrms.
To analyze what will happen after this announcement, we ﬁrst introduce the emission
reaction commitment contract. This contract is crucial for the rest of the analysis.
Deﬁnition 1 An ‘emission reaction commitment contract’ between members of coali-




If ﬁrm j signed the above mentioned contract we will say ‘ﬁrm j committed itself
to emission reaction curve eS
j (· )’. By means of this emission reaction commitment
contract each ﬁrm in the coalition commits itself to an endogenous abatement eﬀort:
by signing the emission reaction commitment contract the ﬁrm commits itself to emit
eS
j ( ˜ ES
j ), where ˜ ES
j = ˜ ES − ˜ eS
j and { ˜ ES,{˜ eS






















From Brouwers ﬁxed point theorem it directly follows that there exists a solution
{˜ ej|j ∈ S} of equations 2-4 as long as emissions are bounded and the functions eS
j ( · )
are continuous.6 Neither of these assumptions seem to be over-restrictive. Moreover, if
4Moreover, the total tax burden for each individual ﬁrm is smaller than under linear taxation as
was pointed out by McKitrick (1999)
5In this section we will - for the time being - assume such a coalition is given. In section 4 we will
deal with the question how such a coalition is formed.
6Conditions for uniqueness of the solution will be discussed in the context of theorem 4.
6the ﬁrms in S would found a body that calculates ˜ ES there would be no need for the
ﬁrms to provide the other ﬁrms in S with their reaction curves which might contain
strategic information. As a result, these commitments together establish the actual
abatement eﬀorts of the ﬁrms in S: ﬁrm i ∈ S will emit ˜ eS
i . Now two questions can
be asked: i) What is the best emission reaction function a ﬁrm can commit itself to
if it would sign such a contract? And ii), will it be attractive for a ﬁrm to sign the
contract? In other words, is it attractive for a ﬁrm to join the coalition? The ﬁrst
question is answered in section 3. The second question will be dealt with in section 4.
3 Commitment and information exchange
Let ˆ E
¯ S
j be the subjective expectation of ﬁrm j with respect to the emissions of ﬁrms
i ∈ ¯ S, where ¯ S = I \ S and i 6= j. That is, ˆ E
¯ S
j is the subjective expectation of ﬁrm j
with respect to the emissions of the ﬁrms outside the coalition.
Theorem 2 Suppose ﬁrms j ∈ S, with j 6= i, committed themselves to reaction curves
eS
j (ES
j ) respectively. Then for ﬁrm i ∈ S, given subjective emission expectations ˆ E
¯ S
i ,














Proof: Theorem 2 follows directly from the deﬁnition of the operator arg min which
generates the emission decision that minimizes the costs of the ﬁrm given the tax
scheme and the subjective emission expectation.7
7Here the assumption that ﬁrms do not believe their abatement decision will simultaneously change
other ﬁrms’ emission levels is crucial.
7Corollary 3 Suppose ﬁrms j ∈ I with j 6= i committed themselves to reaction curves
eI
j(EI
j) respectively. Then for ﬁrm i there is no better reaction function to commit to
then eI
i(EI
i ) = argmin{C(ei) + D(EI
i + ei) − D(EI
i )}.
Corollary 3 follows directly from theorem 2 by selecting S = I. Given these reaction
curves, there is good reason to believe the ﬁrms can ﬁnd the solution {˜ eI
j|j ∈ I} of
equations 2 and 3: emulating the adjustment rule suggested by McKitrick (1999) meant
for long run adaptation by means of an algorithm that converges to the ﬁxed point,
the ﬁrms in I can ﬁnd {˜ eI
j|j ∈ I} directly and will behave accordingly. We are now
ready to address the welfare consequences of corollary 3, i.e. the welfare aspects of
{˜ eI
j|j ∈ I}:
Theorem 4 If ﬁrms i ∈ I commit to reaction curves eI
i(EI
i ) = argmin{C(ei)+D(EI
i +
ei)−D(EI
i )}, then ˜ ei = e∗
i for all i, and therefore ˜ EI = E∗. That is, all ﬁrms will emit
at the social optimal level.
Proof: If ˜ EI
i is the realized total emission level of all ﬁrms except i, the emission level
ﬁrm i committed itself to, eI
i( ˜ EI
i ) = argmin{C(ei)+D( ˜ EI
i +ei)−D( ˜ EI
i )}, satisﬁes the
ﬁrst order conditions in equation 1 by virtue of the arg min operator. This of course
holds for all i ∈ I. Consequently, it follows from equations 3 and 4 that ˜ EI − ˜ eI
i = ˜ EI
i
indeed is the emission level of all ﬁrms expect i. Which proves the theorem.8 By
combining corollary 3 and theorem 4 we ﬁnd that if all ﬁrms would sign the most
attractive emission reaction commitment contract from their point of view, this would
8This theorem is closely related to proposition 3 in McKitrick (1999). Theorem 4 also gives a clue
with respect to uniqueness of the solution of equations 2-4: If S = I and if (e∗
1,....,e∗
n) is unique, then
the solution of the equations 2-4 must also be unique. A socially optimal emissions vector (e∗
1,....,e∗
n)
itself is unique under the assumptions with respect to the derivatives of C(ei) and D(E) as formulated
in section 2.
8result in the eﬃcient emission level. From the point of view of the regulator it seems
to be very attractive if all ﬁrms would sign a contract like that. So the question is: do
ﬁrms have an incentive to sign a contract like that? I.e. under what circumstance will
they join the coalition? We will deal with that question in the following section.
4 Coalition formation
With the question whether ﬁrms have an incentive to join the coalition we enter the
ﬁeld of cooperative game theory.
4.1 Coalition formation: cooperative games with asymmetric
information
In section 3 we implicitly deﬁned a cooperative game with asymmetric information,
where the pay-oﬀ from joining a coalition is equal to the abatement cost reduction plus
the tax burden reduction resulting from mutual information exchange and commitment
(e.g. Mas-Colell et al., 1995; Allen, 1997; Schwalbe, 1999).
Though the abatement cost and tax burden reduction resulting from mutual informa-
tion exchange and commitment can easily be shared among members of a coalition,
we will analyze the incentives for ﬁrms to join a coalition in the absence of transfers.
The reason for that is that the cost and tax burden reductions depend on subjective
ex ante emission estimates. As a result, measures of individual contributions to the
collective cost reduction eﬀort - like Shapley values - can neither ex-ante nor ex-post be
determined unambiguously, which makes agreements with respect to ex-post transfers
very unlikely. Consequently, we implicitly interpret the game as a cooperative game
with asymmetric information and non-transferable utility (Allen, 1997).
9Within the coalition information is shared completely among coalition members. This
characteristic of coalition formation within a cooperative game with asymmetric in-
formation was ﬁrst described as full communication system in the seminal paper by
Wilson (1978, p.807). The fundamental diﬀerence with the set-up in Wilson (1978)
is that in this paper - as argued above - the assumption is adopted that no transfers
can be agreed upon. So only information is shared among coalition members. Due to
the special characteristics of the good ‘information’ compared with traditional goods
- information cannot be returned if one is not satisﬁed, i.e. one cannot be forced to
forget (e.g. Hirshlifer and Riley, 1992, section 5.2) - the relevance of concepts like ‘core’
and ‘blocking’ seem to be limited in our application: once a ﬁrm is in the coalition and
found out about the value of the information good there is no way it could leave the
coalition and form another coalition.
Unaware of a rigorous and applicable treatment of this special form of game9, I will take
an intuitive approach to analyze the incentives for coalition formation in the following
of this section.
4.2 Coalition formation: an intuitive approach
By joining S, ﬁrm i gets reliable information on the individual reaction functions and
abatement decisions of the members of S and therefore has better information about
the future total emission level and the future marginal tax level it will face. As a result,
one would expect ﬁrm i to do a better job in minimizing the sum of reduction costs
and tax payments if it joins the coalition.
Following the same reasoning, one would believe that members of the coalition would
always welcome a new member: if ﬁrm i joins S, members of the coalition will get
reliable information with respect to the abatement decision of ﬁrm i, and therefore will
9Suggestions will be welcomed by the author.
10be better able to anticipate the marginal tax level. Reality, unfortunately, turns out
to be slightly more complex.
The following theorem answers the question what exactly makes it attractive or unattrac-
tive for a ﬁrm to join the coalition:
Lemma 5 If ﬁrms j ∈ S ⊆ I committed themselves to eS
j (ES
j ), then ﬁrm i joining the
coalition - thereby forming the new coalition S0 = S∪{i} - would be confronted with two
eﬀects on its costs: 1) an eﬀect caused by adapting its own abatement decision after
receiving correct information on emission decisions of the members of the coalition,
and 2) an eﬀect caused by changing abatement behavior of the ﬁrms in the coalition
after they received the correct information on the emission decision by ﬁrm i.
Proof: Let ˆ eS
i be the emission decision by ﬁrm i if it does not join the coalition, and
let ˜ eS0
i be the emission decision by ﬁrm i when it does:
ˆ e
S
i = argmin{Ci(ˆ e
S
i ) + D( ˆ E
¯ S
i + ˆ E
S
i + ˆ e
S
i ) − D( ˆ E
¯ S
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i ) + D( ˆ E
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i be the realized emissions of the ﬁrms in ¯ S after the tax system has been
introduced, and let KS
i ( · ) be the abatement plus tax costs that ﬁrm i has to pay if a
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i ) is positive. This diﬀerence

















































11Equation 8 reveals two eﬀects:
Eﬀect α This is the cost change resulting from ﬁrm i having more information on the
emission decisions of the ﬁrms in the coalition.
Eﬀect β This is the cost change resulting from an adaptation of the emission decisions
by the ﬁrms in the coalition.
End of proof.
Under standard second order conditions the cost change caused by Eﬀect α will be
positive (i.e. joining the coalition reduces abatement costs plus tax costs) if ˆ E
¯ S




i + ˜ ES
i than ˆ E
¯ S
i + ˆ ES
i . That is, when joining the coalition leads to a more
realistic estimation of total emissions. This will be the case in general, because ﬁrm
i after joining the coalition will have perfect information with respect to emissions of
the ﬁrms in S, in stead of its subjective estimate.
The sign of Eﬀect β, however, is ex ante less clear. It will be negative if the ﬁrms in
the coalition raise their emissions after ﬁnding out about the reaction function of ﬁrm
i, i.e. when they found out - after i joined the coalition - that they over-estimated ﬁrm
i’s emissions. This eﬀect will be close to zero if the errors of the ﬁrms in S with respect
the emission decision by ﬁrm i level each other more or less out.
Under assumption 6 ﬁrm i will join the coalition:
Assumption 6 Firm i / ∈ S believes the cost reducing Eﬀect α is larger than its (po-
tentially cost raising) Eﬀect β.
In general one would expect that assumption 6 is satisﬁed: the larger the summed
emissions of the members of S are relative to those of the individual ﬁrm i, the larger
Eﬀect α will be relative to Eﬀect β. Moreover, the less successful ﬁrm i is in suggesting
12his marginal emission reduction costs will be higher than they actually are, the less
positive will Eﬀect β be. In the situation at hand it seems diﬃcult for ﬁrm i to deceit
structurally, because ﬁrms - inside and outside the coalition - expect it to cheat and
therefore will for example base their subjective expectations on independently reported
data, not on those provided by ﬁrm i.
Now we turn to the question in what circumstances individual members of the coalition
would gain from ﬁrm i joining the coalition.
Lemma 7 Member j of coalition S is confronted with two eﬀects when ﬁrm i / ∈ S
joins the coalition, thereby forming the new coalition S0 = S ∪{i}: 1) an eﬀect through
adaptation of the abatement decision of j itself, originating from receiving correct in-
formation on abatement behavior of ﬁrm i, and 2) an eﬀect through adaptation of the
behavior of the other ﬁrms due to new information on behavior of ﬁrm i.
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Eﬀect a. Eﬀect a is the cost change caused by adaptation of the abatement decision
by ﬁrm j after receiving reliable information on the abatement decision of ﬁrm i.
Eﬀect b. Eﬀect b is the cost change caused by adaptation of the other ﬁrms in the






i + ˜ ES
j +ej is closer to RE
¯ S
i + ˜ ES
i than ˆ E
¯ S
i + ˆ ES
i , then the ﬁrst eﬀect will
have a downward eﬀect on the costs of ﬁrm j. If knowledge of the true emission level
of ﬁrm i is closer to the realized emission level, then Eﬀect α will lower the cost. This
will in general be the case. Because the sign of the second eﬀect is unclear, it is to be
expected - if systematic deception fails - ﬁrms in the coalition gain from new members
entering the coalition.
We will formulate this as an assumption:
Assumption 8 Firms j ∈ S believe the negative Eﬀect a on their costs to be larger
than the (potentially positive) Eﬀect b.
Summarizing the results of our analysis in this section so far: in general one can say
ﬁrms will be inclined to form ‘information exchange and commitment coalitions’ if the
value of the information with respect to the true emission decisions by the other ﬁrms is
higher than the lower tax payment and reduction costs caused by successful deception
of the other ﬁrms. The latter ability is likely to be aﬀected by the distrust by the
other ﬁrms who are aware of this attitude, making joining the coalition more sensible
for individual ﬁrms.
We are now ready to formulate the main result of this paper:
Theorem 9 If
• information exchange and legal services are relatively cheap, and
• ﬁrms do not believe their abatement decisions will simultaneously change other
ﬁrms’ emission levels, and
• assumptions 6 and 8 hold,
14then the announcement of tax level D(E) − D(Ei) for ﬁrms i ∈ I, an announcement
preceding abatement decisions of the ﬁrms, automatically results in a the socially eﬃ-
cient abatement level through the formation of a coalition consisting of all ﬁrms that
exchange and commit themselves to emission reaction curves.
Proof: Theorem 9 follows directly from corollary 3, theorem 4, and lemmas 5 and 7.
If the ﬁrms are made aware of this mechanism they might as well start committing
to reaction curves with respect to the largest possible coalition I, instead of starting
with small coalitions. This would reduce the total sum of transaction costs to only a
fraction of the original costs. This observation makes the ﬁrst condition in theorem
9 less stringent. Please note also that the standard Cournot assumption (the second
condition in theorem 9) gets more realistic the more polluting ﬁrms there are.
5 Conclusions and discussion
Kim and Chang (1993) showed that the Nash equilibrium resulting from the imple-
mentation of a simple non-linear ‘diﬀerential pollution tax’ is socially eﬃcient without
the regulator knowing marginal abatement costs. This equilibrium will, however, only
be attained if ﬁrms know the emissions of other ﬁrms and can costless adapt to abate-
ment decisions by other ﬁrms. This seems to be restrictive because usually abatement
decisions involve sunk costs or take time to be implemented.
McKitrick (1999) addressed this problem and showed that under the ‘diﬀerential pol-
lution tax’ suggested by Kim and Chang (1993), ﬁrms might follow a clever abatement
adaptation strategy, and will - by sequentially adapting their emission levels - even-
tually emit the socially optimal amount. As a result, McKitrick concluded that the
‘diﬀerential tax’ triggers the socially eﬃcient emission level in the long run, where ‘long
15run’ refers to the fact that it takes several abatement adaptation decisions by the ﬁrm
to reach the socially eﬃcient emission level.
In this paper it was shown that in the presence of the ‘diﬀerential tax’
• ﬁrms will emit at the socially eﬃcient level if they are member of a coalition of
ﬁrms that mutually exchange information with respect to their future abatement
decisions and committed themselves to act accordingly, and
• ﬁrms have - under mild conditions - an incentive to join the coalition of ﬁrms
that exchange information and commit themselves to act accordingly.
These results hold under the condition that ﬁrms assume they cannot inﬂuence the
emission of other ﬁrms by means of their emission decision - the standard Cournot
assumption that is not unreasonable in case of many polluting ﬁrms. As a result, the
‘diﬀerential pollution tax’ suggested by Kim and Chang (1993) leads instantly - i.e.
without abatement adaptation - to eﬃcient abatement levels, without any information
requirement for the regulator.
Consequently, the diﬀerential pollution tax leads to lower social costs than traditional
non-linear pollution taxation adaptation schemes that only reach the eﬃcient emission
levels after an usually unspeciﬁed period of time in which ﬁrms adapt their emissions to
new tax levels until an equilibrium is reached. During this period marginal abatement
costs are not equal to marginal damage costs which results in higher social costs than
under the diﬀerential tax scheme that reduces social costs to the theoretical minimum
instantly.
This result suggests that the diﬀerential tax should play a major role in the analysis
of environmental policy instruments when (future) abatement costs are uncertain, for
example in the presence of innovation with respect to pollution reducing technologies.
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